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strategists seeking to understand the
war in some form less than book size.
Arkin advises readers not to be deceived
by appearances or Powerpoint briefings
on just what decided victory for the
Nato allies. The article certainly should
replace the disingenuous official
Kosovo report by the secretary of de-
fense used in the curriculum of the
Naval War College and other service
schools.
However, the Arkin piece is only the
appetizer. There is insufficient room to
highlight all the fine articles in this re-
view, but two struck this reviewer be-
tween the eyes. In the first, Anatol
Lieven warns American “hawks” not to
believe Kosovo is a model for future
wars but that the conflict “will persuade
. . . adversaries to confront the West in-
directly, using nonstate actors.” This
was written before 11 September 2002.
Lieven points out that the chaotic, de-
centralized, and violent nature of likely
future conflict environments, including
Afghanistan, can negate the high-
technology advantages of the West,
forcing the fighting down to earth on
conditions more to the liking of the en-
emy. Reading Lieven, and then watch-
ing General Tommy Franks tell U.S.
troops in Afghanistan that the war will
be a long one, made this reviewer’s
hands cold and sweaty. In the second
article, Andrew Bacevich conducts a re-
visionist tour de force describing the
evolution of the Clausewitzian “re-
markable trinity” as it applies to the
United States, focusing especially on the
latest changes effected by the Clinton
administration and first demonstrated
in Kosovo. At the risk of simplification,
Bacevich would have the current trinity
composed of a globally involved gov-
ernment able to use a professional, not
conscript, armed force wherever it
wants in face of an uninterested public—
as long as the conflict is quick and
bloodless. Whether or not one agrees
with Bacevich’s premise and findings,
the power and flow of the author’s con-
ceptualization is truly impressive.
This is a necessary book for those who
teach and practice national security.
The writing and thinking are deep and
compelling. One must congratulate the
editors for their selections. One also
must hope that defense decision mak-
ers, as well as students who will form
the next generation of leadership, will
read and pay serious attention to the
works in this book.
JON CZARNECKI
Associate Professor of Joint Maritime Operations
Naval War College, Monterey Program
Locher, James R., III. Victory on the Potomac.
College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2002.
507pp. $34.95
Jim Locher describes the history of the
intense bureaucratic struggle to rede-
sign relationships between the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, secretary of defense, the presi-
dent, and Congress. The prolonged
struggle culminated in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986. This document is
thought by many to be the most sweep-
ing military reform of the last forty
years. Senators Barry Goldwater and
Sam Nunn believed the system was bro-
ken and consequently was providing
low-quality military advice to the
secretary of defense. Others, particu-
larly the service chiefs and the secretary
of defense, strongly disagreed with this
assessment. Victory on the Potomac
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represents a dramatic, detailed, and
sometimes entertaining description of
the prolonged hardball political maneu-
vering and bureaucratic infighting be-
tween those for and those against
reform. Locher colorfully describes the
tactics and personalities of the key fig-
ures involved in the debate. He begins
with the long and difficult history of ef-
forts made during the Harry Truman
and Dwight Eisenhower era to reform the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and to strengthen the
role of its chairman. Locher then fo-
cuses on Senator Goldwater, Senator
Nunn, Representative Ike Skelton, Rep-
resentative Bill Nichols, and key staffs’
detailed strategy for reform. Their ef-
forts led to bitter confrontations with
senior military and civilian leaders who
held the view that proposed legislation
would cripple the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s
influence. Of particular interest is Sec-
retary of the Navy John Lehman’s total
opposition to the legislative proposals
and his tactics to outflank the legisla-
tors and, indeed, at times to outflank
his own boss, Secretary of Defense Cas-
per Weinberger. Locher also describes
the particular difficulties for senior mil-
itary officers favoring reform. Individ-
uals like Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.,
exhibited the utmost delicacy in balanc-
ing personal beliefs with the Pentagon’s
antireform stand.
Although the book emphasizes the
Goldwater-Nichols struggle, it is a text-
book on the complexities and strategies
of bureaucratic politics fought for high
stakes between the legislative and exec-
utive branches. Emotion, parochialism,
and legitimate beliefs conflict and, at
times, become highly personal. Stu-
dents of government politics will find
that the book adds generously to in-
sights on the dynamics of gaining
support for, or fighting against, signifi-
cant legislative proposals. Readers with
serious interest in national security pol-
icy formulation will benefit from the
detailed examination of how arguments
are developed, coalitions are con-
structed, and past history (such as Leb-
anon and Grenada) is marshaled to
support either side of a debate. Those
who favored reform will marvel at the
persistence and political skill of the ad-
vocates. Those opposed will, no doubt,
regard many of the described political
tactics as unfair and perhaps unethical.
In an excellent epilogue, Locher reiter-
ates the original purposes for the legis-
lation and uses them to evaluate the
present success of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act provisions. His analysis has
balance and notes that the behaviorial
changes sought have not been fully real-
ized, but he does conclude that the leg-
islation “made significant and positive
contributions in improving the quality
of military advice.” Locher observes
that this judgment is shared by princi-
pal customers of the Joint Staff and by
senior Joint Staff practitioners. Those
who believe that significant improve-
ment has resulted include former
secretary of defense Dick Cheney,
Colin Powell, and General John M.
Shalikashvilli. In a separate book of his
own, Admiral Crowe, the first chairman
under Goldwater-Nichols, noted that
the increased authority of the chairman
was a significant benefit and not overly
contested by the heads of service. In-
creasing the authority of the regional
commanders was thought to add much
to their capability for fulfilling war-
fighting roles. General Powell added
that the Joint Staff had “improved so
dramatically [that] it had become the
premier military staff in the world.”
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The epilogue also examines disappoint-
ments, including the observation that
“the Pentagon still lacks a vision of its
needs for Joint officers and how to pre-
pare and reward them.”
Locher is a graduate of West Point and
the Harvard Business School. He was a
leading Goldwater-Nichols strategist on
the staff of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services. He is the authority on
the detailed political pulls and tugs that
brought Goldwater-Nichols into exis-
tence. While Locher strives for a bal-
anced analysis, his commitment to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and his own
key role in that process result in a more
detailed examination of the proponents’
view while giving less detail to the argu-
ments of the opponents. Some of the
opponents he classifies as excessively pa-
rochial, while others are characterized as
ignoring obvious system flaws.
Goldwater-Nichols has had an unques-
tioned major effect on the Joint Staff
process and on officer education. It is
and will be for many years, the subject
of intensive debate and analysis.
Locher’s book will be an important ref-
erence in this debate (and in turn, his
article “Has It Worked? The Goldwater-
Nichols Reorganization Act,” in the
Autumn 2001 issue of this journal, is a
good introduction to it). I strongly rec-
ommend that anyone interested or in-
volved in the national security process
read this book. It describes democracy
at work and just how hard that process
can be.
WILLIAM TURCOTTE
Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
Shachtman, Tom. Terrors and Marvels: How Sci-
ence and Technology Changed the Character and
Outcome of World War II. New York: William
Morrow, 2002. 360pp. $26.95
Tom Schachtman’s brief history of the
influence of science and technology on
World War II needs less “gee whiz” and
more John McPhee. As in the war itself,
the author’s strategic decisions are criti-
cal to the book’s successes and failures.
The successes can be quickly acknowl-
edged. The book is well written.
Shachtman shows a good familiarity
with the oral histories and memoirs of
the most prominent scientists. He is in-
teresting when identifying personalities
and providing biographical material to
enliven the narrative. He also correctly
treats most of the significant scientific-
technical developments of the war: the
exploitation of the electromagnetic
spectrum for command and control,
navigation, and target acquisition;
guidance systems for such ordnance as
acoustic torpedoes and proximity-fused
shells; nuclear weapons; signals intelli-
gence; jet propulsion; and chemical and
biological warfare.
Now I’ll drop the other cyclotron. Ter-
rors and Marvels does too little with too
much, and it suffers from Shachtman’s
attempt to be international and chrono-
logical. Except for the fact that some-
how the Allies “did better science” than
the Axis (all those refugees from Na-
zism certainly helped), the author offers
little explanation of how all these Allied
wonder weapons, crypto dominance,
and radar-sonar devices came about. If
Shachtman had written separate chap-
ters on his prize weapons, one would be
far the wiser about the scientific and
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